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Perceived-As Plaintiffs: 
Expanding Title VII Coverage to 
Discrimination Based on 
Erroneous Perception 
“As with the joy of beauty, the ugliness of bias can be in the eye 
of the beholder.”1 
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1. Perkins v. Lake Cty. Dep’t of Util., 860 F. Supp. 1262, 1277–78 (N.D. Ohio 
1994). 




Robert Smith, a practicing Catholic, worked for Specialty Pool for 
a month when discrimination against his “perceived-as” Jewish identity 
began.2 His manager erroneously believed Smith was a “Jew” and did 
not like him as result.3 Smith was referred to multiple times daily as 
“Hebrew,” “Jew Boy,” and “Kike.”4 The manager consistently raised a 
Nazi salute in front of him, once commenting that “Hitler did not do a 
good enough job” because Smith was still alive.5 On its face, this 
appears to be a straightforward example of illegal employment discri-
mination. However, depending on the court, the case could have been 
dismissed at the outset because Smith was not actually Jewish. That 
is, Smith was not discriminated against based on his actual religion. 
Rather, Smith was discriminated against because he was “perceived as” 
being Jewish. 
This Note argues that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
(Title VII) covers discrimination where an individual is perceived as 
being a certain race or ethnicity, whether or not that individual is act-
ually a member of that class. Further, the courts that have allowed for 
such claims to proceed have more persuasive reasoning, given the stat-
utory interpretation, congressional intent, and contemporary under-
standing of identity. 
Part I briefly summarizes the background of Title VII and recent 
perceived-as cases that have surfaced. Part II explains why courts that 
confront such claims should not follow the reasoning of prior courts that 
have imposed an actuality requirement.  
Part III will explore how perceived-as discrimination claims should 
be analyzed under Title VII. First, the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) has promulgated definitions and regulations that 
recognize perceived-as discrimination claims under Title VII. Next, this 
Note compares Title VII to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 
and explains why Title VII perception claims should be analyzed like 
disability-perception claims. Part IV argues that the inherent com-
plexity and social construct of identity justifies a shift in Title VII 
analysis from an individual’s actual identity to a focus on the employ-
er’s discriminatory actions. Finally, Part V recommends how to apply 
perceived-as analysis to future employment-discrimination claims.  
 
2.  Smith v. Specialty Pool Contractors, No. 02:07CV1464, 2008 WL 4410163, 
at *2 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 2008). 
3. Id. at *1.  
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
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I. Background of Title VII and Perceived-As Claims 
 Title VII was enacted to prohibit employment discrimination on 
the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”6 The purpose 
of Title VII is to eliminate these invidious forms of discrimination in 
the workplace and give redress to those who experience discrimination 
on the basis of their membership in those protected classes.7 Title VII 
protection often focuses on “perception and appearance” for 
employment-discrimination claims.8 
A. Background of Title VII Protection 
 It is unlawful for an employer to refuse to hire or to discriminate 
against individuals on the basis of their protected class membership.9 
Title VII prohibits employers from (1) discriminating against an indi-
vidual (2) because of (3) such individuals’ religion, race, sex, national 
origin, or color.10 A prima facie disparate-treatment case first requires 
plaintiffs to demonstrate that they “belong to a protected class.”11 
Plaintiffs who prove that they are “member[s] of a protected class” also 
must prove that they were subject to discrimination based on their 
membership in the protected class.12 
It is significant for the advancement of perceived-as claims that 
Title VII does not define the protected classes covered under the 
statute. One could conclude that Title VII’s protected classes are there-
fore static and universally have the same meaning, and thus do not 
need to be defined. However, an alternative possibility for the lack of a 
 
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012). 
7. See Lightner v. City of Wilmington, 545 F.3d 260, 264 (4th Cir. 2008). In this 
Note, “protected class” means the classifications protected under Title VII of 
race, color, national origin, and religion. “Protected class” will be used when 
the actual classification may be interchangeable. 
8. Perkins v. Lake Cty. Dep’t of Util., 860 F. Supp. 1262, 1277 (N.D. Ohio 
1994) (explaining that “consistent with the intent of Title VII, when racial 
discrimination is involved perception and appearance are everything”). 
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012). 
10. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2032 (2015). 
11. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); see also 
Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 909 (11th Cir. 1982) (developing 
similar tests for proof of discrimination under Title VII, without direct 
evidence). The prima facie case for a disparate treatment discrimination 
claim under Title VII is: (1) the Plaintiff belongs to a protected class; (2) 
the Plaintiff applied for and was qualified for the job; (3) the Plaintiff was 
rejected; and (4) after rejection, the employer continued to seek applicants 
similarly situated to the Plaintiff. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. There 
is disagreement as to how rigidly the McDonnell Douglas test should be 
applied to Title VII claims. See infra note 153 and accompanying text. 
12.  McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.  
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definition could be that identities of protected classes are complex, and 
there is no need for a precise and codified legal definition. Nonetheless, 
issues of what races and national origins should be protected, what 
“color” means, and what religious practices are covered have arisen 
under Title VII.13 
Unlike other federal antidiscrimination statutes, 14 Title VII does 
not explicitly define the class of people protected.15 Since the statute 
lacks definitions, courts and litigants sometimes turn to other sources 
to determine applicability, such as agency regulations and definitions 
from similar laws.16 When controversies do arise regarding whether a 
plaintiff is a member of a protected class, courts generally apply in-
clusive definitions of race, national origin, color, and religion. For 
example, the Supreme Court held that white employees and applicants 
are protected under Title VII,17 arguably contrary to the legislative 
intent.18  
Since defining a person’s race can be deceptively complex,19 it may 
be helpful to compare similar antidiscrimination statutes to determine 
the definition of race under federal law.20 These statutes define race to 
include identities usually thought of as national origin, such as 
Hispanic, Indian, or Arab.21 The absence of a racial definition in Title 
 
13.  See, e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) 
(holding that Title VII protects white employees from discrimination on the 
basis of race). 
14. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(a) (2012) (prohibiting discrimination based on 
disability); 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2006) (prohibiting discrimination based on 
age). 
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e). 
16. See infra notes 17–38 and accompanying text. 
17. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976). 
18. The most prominent matter of public concern was seemingly protection for 
African-Americans, as evidenced by President Lyndon B. Johnson’s remarks 
after signing the bill into law. See Radio and Television Remarks Upon 
Signing the Civil Rights Bill, II Pub. Papers 842 (July 2, 1964). (“[M]illions 
are being deprived [of liberty] . . . because of the color of their skin. . . . [The 
Act says] that . . . those who are equal before God shall now also be equal 
in the . . . factories . . . and other places that provide service to the public."). 
19. See infra Part IV; see also infra notes 55–57 and accompanying text. 
20. See, e.g., Arsham v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 85 F. Supp. 3d 841, 848 
(D. Md. 2015) (citing to § 1981 and § 1983 cases in recognizing perceived-as 
discrimination under Title VII); Perkins v. Lake Cty. Dep’t of Util., 860 F. 
Supp. 1262, 1272–73 (N.D. Ohio 1994) (same). 
21. Perkins cited to § 1981 cases that permitted a “race” claim for identities 
typically thought of as a national origin to show the difficulty of defining 
and distinguishing identities. Id. at 1273–74. See also St. Francis College v. 
Al–Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, (1987) (holding that “Arab” is a race for § 1981 
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VII may demonstrate Congress’s awareness of the difficulty of providing 
and distinguishing definitions of race and identity in statutory language 
for inclusive protection.22 
Color, another protected class under Title VII, is also not defined.23 
Color discrimination is not a common claim under Title VII.24 However, 
color discrimination claims may be appropriate for Plaintiffs who have 
a “mixture of races and ancestral national origins.”25 Some courts go so 
far as to hold that color and race claims are indistinguishable because 
of the nuanced relationship between the two protected classes.26 
National origin also has no statutory definition under Title VII.27 
The Supreme Court has held that national origin refers to plaintiffs’ or 
their ancestors’ place of birth. 28 The EEOC considers national origin as 
covering places of origin, rather than countries of origin under Title 
VII.29 This expands protection for individuals whose ethnic or national 
identity does not fit neatly into a country of origin. As a result, Title 
VII’s national origin category includes identities not typically 
 
purposes); McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 316 n.39 (1987) (holding that 
“Hispanic” is a race for § 1981 purposes).  
22. See infra Part IV. 
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012); see Felix v. Marquez, No. 78-2314, 1981 WL 275, 
n.11 (D.D.C. Mar. 26, 1981) (“[T]he legislative history of these acts is silent 
on the meaning of the term ‘color,’ and no definitive interpretation has been 
provided by the courts.”). Color discrimination claims have been sustained 
on the basis of preference for light-skinned African-Americans over dark-
skinned applicants. See Walker v. Sec'y of Treasury, 713 F. Supp. 403, 407–
08 (N.D. Ga. 1990) (explaining that “it would take an ethnocentric and naive 
world view to suggest that we can divide caucasians into many sub-groups 
but some how all blacks are part of the same sub-group”). 
24. See Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2015, EEOC, 
http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm [https://perma.cc 
/FB5U-8P94] (last visited Mar. 14, 2016) (in 2015, color discrimination 
claims accounted for only 3.2% of all employment discrimination claims.); 
see also Felix, 1981 WL 275, at *11 (“Color is a rare claim, but considering 
the mixture of races and ancestral national origins in Puerto Rico, it can be 
an appropriate claim for a Puerto Rican to present.”). 
25. Id. (holding that color discrimination is an “appropriate” claim for Puerto 
Rican plaintiffs). 
26. See supra note 23 and accompanying text; Part IV.A. 
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012). 
28. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 88 (1973). Espinoza was the first 
Supreme Court case to address national origin claims under Title VII. 
Notably, Espinoza also states that the EEOC guidelines are “no doubt 
entitled to great deference.” Id. at 94. See also infra Part III.B. 
29. 29 C.F.R. § 1606 (2015). See infra Part III.B. 
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considered “national,” such as Cajun, Gypsy, and Native American.30 
Title VII also prohibits discrimination for nonminority national origins, 
regardless of the historical discrimination or disadvantage of the 
group.31  
The larger point is that courts interpret Title VII' to broadly pro-
scribes employment policies “which operate to disadvantage the em-
ployment opportunities of any group . . . including Caucasians.”32 
Religion is the only defined protected class under Title VII.33 Reli-
gion includes “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well 
as belief.”34 This broad definition protects individuals belonging to un-
common religions, atheists, and practices not necessarily mandated by 
a religious authority.35 There are two types of religious discrimination 
prohibited under Title VII.36 First, it is unlawful for an employer to fail 
to reasonably accommodate a religious practice or belief.37 Second, Title 
VII protects employees and applicants against discrimination based on 
 
30. See Roach v. Dresser Indus. Valve & Instrument Div., 494 F. Supp. 215, 218 
(W.D. La. 1980) (holding plaintiff of Cajun descent was covered under 
national origin definition); Janko v. Illinois State Toll Highway Auth., 704 
F. Supp. 1531, 1532 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (holding that Gypsies are covered under 
national origin because Congress intended to protect these kinds of groups); 
Perkins v. Lake Cty. Dep’t of Util., 860 F. Supp. 1262, 1278 (N.D. Ohio 
1994) (recognizing protection for Native Americans, although it was a case 
based on mistaken identity). 
31. See EEOC v. Consol. Servs. Sys., 777 F. Supp. 599, 607 (N.D. Ill. 1991), aff’d, 
989 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1993) (assuming the possibility of a Korean employer 
discriminating against non-Koreans). Even an “American” national origin is 
protected under Title VII. See Fortino v. Quasar Co., 751 F. Supp. 1306, 1315 
(N.D. Ill. 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 950 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1991). 
32. McDonald v. Santa Fe Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 279–80 (citations omitted). 
See also infra Part IV. 
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012). 
34. Id. 
35. See Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444, 453 (7th Cir. 2013) 
(explaining that “Title VII . . . do[es] not require perfect consistency . . . when 
determining if a belief system qualifies as a religion or whether a person’s 
belief is sincere”); Young v. Sw. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 509 F.2d 140, 144 (5th 
Cir. 1975) (holding that an atheist established a prima facie case under Title 
VII); Anderson v. USF Logistics Inc., 274 F.3d 470, 475 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(suggesting Title VII may cover more than what is necessarily mandated by 
religion). 
36. See generally Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 603–07 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (distinguishing between the two types of religious discrimination). 
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012) (requiring an employer to make reasonable 
accommodations to “all aspects of [religion] unless an employer demonstrates 
that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an observance or practice 
without undue hardship”). 
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a religious affiliation.38 This second cause of action acknowledges that 
religion may sometimes be more than a practice or ritual, maybe play-
ing a larger role for individuals, such as ethnic or otherwise fundamental 
identity.39 
B. Current Judicial Recognition of Perceived-as Claims 
The Supreme Court and federal circuit courts of appeals have yet 
to answer whether a perceived-as discrimination claim is cognizable 
under Title VII.40 However, the Ninth Circuit held that perceived-as 
claims are covered under another federal remedial statute, which also 
does not explicitly provide for these claims, because mistaken per-
ception “does not make that discrimination or its resulting injury less 
direct.”41 Similarly, the Third Circuit assumed that a perceived-as 
plaintiff would be protected under Title VII.42 
In 1994, the first district court to consider a perceived-as claim held 
that perceived-as discrimination is prohibited under Title VII.43 In 2004, 
another district court held that perceived-as claims are not cognizable 
under Title VII as a matter of law and dismissed the claim on summary 
judgment.44 Some courts have cited to Butler v. Potter45 for this same 
proposition.46 However, many other district courts have found Butler’s 
 
38. This type of religious discrimination is analyzed the same as all other cases 
under Title VII. Charity Williams, Note, Misperceptions Matter: Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Protects Employees from Discrimination 
Based on Misperceived Religious Status, 2008 Utah L. Rev. 357, 364–66 
(2008) (explaining how to prove both types of claims). 
39. See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text. 
40. But see Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283, 1299 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(“[A] harasser’s use of epithets associated with a different ethnic or racial 
minority than the plaintiff will not necessarily shield an employer from 
liability for a hostile work environment.”). See also infra Part IV.B.2. 
41. Estate of Amos v. City of Page, 257 F.3d 1086, 1094 (9th Cir. 2001). See 
supra note 20. 
42. Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., 283 F.3d 561, 571 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that 
plaintiff may bring a perceived-as retaliation claim under FLSA). See infra 
notes 71–76 and accompanying text. 
43. Perkins v. Lake Cty. Dep’t of Util., 860 F. Supp. 1262, 1277–78 (N.D. Ohio 
1994) (holding that Title VII protected plaintiff from discrimination based 
on employer’s mistaken belief that he was Native American). 
44. Butler v. Potter, 345 F. Supp. 2d 844, 850 (E.D. Tenn. 2004). 
45. 345 F. Supp. 2d 844 (E.D. Tenn. 2004). 
46. El v. Max Daetwyler Corp., No. 3:09CV415, 2011 WL 1769805, at *5 
(W.D.N.C. May 9, 2011), aff’d, 451 F. App’x 257 (4th Cir. 2011); Lewis v. 
North General Hosp., 502 F. Supp. 2d 390, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding 
that Title VII does not cover misperception of religion); Yousif v. Landers 
McClarty Olathe KS, LLC, No. 12-2788-CM, 2013 WL 5819703, at *3 (D. 
Kan. Oct. 29, 2013) (same); Burrage v. FedEx Freight, Inc., 4:10CV2755, 
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reasoning unpersuasive and held that Title VII does prohibit perceived-
as discrimination.47 
1. Courts that Recognize Perceived-As Claims 
Two recent district court cases that considered perceived-as claims 
held that Title VII prohibits this type of discrimination.48 These cases, 
along with others, focus on the employer’s actions rather than applying 
a strict actuality requirement for the plaintiff’s identity.  
Perkins v. Lake County49 was the first federal case to address 
whether an employer may be liable for perceived-as discrimination.50 
Arthur Perkins brought a Title VII suit against his employer in the 
Northern District of Ohio, alleging that he was subjected to discri-
mination because of a Native American identity.51 To rebut this claim, 
the Defendant called an expert witness to trace Perkins’s ancestry in 
order to prove that Perkins was not Native American.52 The expert 
“performed exhaustive research of said ancestry and racial composition 
through the U.S. census, birth and death records, Bureau of Indian 
 
2012 WL 1068794, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2012) (holding that Title VII 
does not cover discrimination based on mistaken race); Uddin v. Universal 
Avionics Sys., 1:05-CV-1115-TWT, 2006 WL 1835291, at *6 (N.D. Ga. 2006) 
(holding that Title VII does not cover religious misperception as matter of 
law); Sears v. Jo-Ann Stores, Inc., No. 3:12–1322, 2014 WL 1665048, at *8 
(M.D. Tenn. 2014) (holding that Title VII does not cover perception claims). 
47. Arsham v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 85 F. Supp. 3d 841, 846 (D. Md. 
2015) (holding that Title VII protected plaintiff who was misperceived to be 
a member of an ethnic class of India); Kallabat v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., Nos. 
12-CV-15470, 2015 WL 5358093, at *6 (E.D. Mich. June 18, 2015) (holding 
that Title VII protected Iraqi plaintiff who was misperceived to be Muslim); 
LaRocca v. Precision Motorcars, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 762, 770 (D. Neb. 1999) 
(holding that Title VII protected Italian plaintiff who was misperceived to 
be Mexican); Wood v. Freeman Decorating Servs., No. 3:08-CV-00375-LRH-
RAM, 2010 WL 653764, at *4 (D. Nev. Feb. 19, 2010) (explaining that “even 
if Defendant’s employees mistakenly believed that Plaintiff was American 
Indian, Defendant may nonetheless be liable for hostile work environment 
harassment”); Zayadeen v. Abbott Molecular, Inc., No. 10-C-4621, 2013 WL 
361726, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 30, 2013) (holding that Title VII protected 
Jordanian plaintiff who was misperceived to be Kazakhstani); Boutros v. 
Avis Rent A Car System, No. 10-C-8196, 2013 WL 3834405, at *7 (N.D. Ill. 
July 24, 2013) (holding that Title VII protected Assyrian plaintiff who was 
misperceived to be Arabic). 
48. Arsham, 85 F. Supp. at 850; Kallabat, 2015 WL 5358093, at *4. 
49. 860 F. Supp. 1262 (N.D. Ohio 1994). 
50. D. Wendy Greene, Categorically Black, White, or Wrong: “Misperception 
Discrimination” and the State of Title VII Protection, 47 U. Mich. J.L. 
Reform 87, 130 (2013).  
51. Perkins, 860 F. Supp. at 1264. 
52. Id. at 1266. 
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Affairs documentation, Smithsonian Institute documentation . . . and 
many other sources.”53 The expert concluded that Perkin’s ancestry 
could not be traced back to any Native American ethnicities or tribes.54 
Perkins detailed the expert’s finding, while also discussing the troubling 
and complicated history of Native American identity and discrimination 
in the United States.55 The court concluded that the “issue of member-
ship in a given racial classification is deceptively complex.”56 Perkins 
denied summary judgment for the defendant and held that an 
“employer’s reasonable belief that a[n] . . . employee is a member of a 
protected class . . . [is what] controls this issue.”57 Perkins signified a 
shift from static definitions to the more modern, complex view of 
identity. 
Ashram v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore58 is a recent District 
of Maryland case that recognized perceived-as discrimination claims 
under Title VII.59 Elie Ashram was discriminated against by her 
employer because he mistakenly believed that she was a member of the 
“Parsee” class, which is a “low ethnic caste” in India.60 Instead, Ashram 
was actually of Persian descent.61 Although Ashram was not “Parsee” 
as her employer believed she was, the court held that Ashram still had 
a cognizable claim for national origin discrimination.62 
Arsham noted that recognizing perceived-as claims is consistent 
with the congressional intent of broadly interpreting Title VII’s protect-
tions.63 Ashram cites to the EEOC’s guidelines and regulations, include-
ing the EEOC’s definition of national origin discrimination “which 
protects plaintiffs who are discriminated against because of a stereotype 
of the protected class.”64 Ashram further reasoned that by denying 
 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 1269 (testifying that Plaintiff had no “provable ancestral ties” to any 
Native American ethnicities). 
55. Id. at 1266–69. 
56. Id. at 1271. 
57. Id. at 1277. 
58. 85 F. Supp. 3d 841 (D. Md. 2015). 
59. Id. at 849. 
60. Id. at 844. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 846. 
64. Id. (explaining that Congress may have felt it unnecessary to revise Title 
VII to conform with the ADA because the EEOC had adapted a broad 
definition of national origin discrimination. The EEOC “defines national 
origin discrimination broadly as including, but not limited to, the denial of 
equal employment opportunity because of an individual’s, or his or her 
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perceived-as claims, “[a] wrong guess, in other words, shields the 
employer from liability for discrimination that is no less injurious to the 
employee than if the employer guessed correctly regarding the 
employee’s national origin.”65 
Kallabat v. Michigan Bell Telephone,66 another 2015 perceived-as 
case, also refused to grant the defendant’s motion for summary judg-
ment.67 The defendant argued that there was no Title VII violation 
because the Plaintiff was not actually Muslim, as the defendant mistak-
enly perceived.68 Although there was no Sixth Circuit precedent, 
Kallabat held that a perceived-as claim at least passes muster against 
summary judgment because a “reasonable jury could find . . . evidence 
of discrimination based on the perception that Plaintiff was a 
Muslim.”69 
Fogleman v. Mercy Hospital70 was a Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
case that addressed perceived-as retaliation discrimination under the 
Federal Labor Standards Act.71 The plaintiff in Fogleman argued that 
he was fired in retaliation when his father sued the employer for dis-
ability discrimination because the plaintiff was “perceived-as” helping 
his father in the litigation, a protected activity under the FLSA.72 The 
plaintiff was not involved at all in litigation; the employer only assumed 
he was.73 Significantly, Fogleman analogized a perceived-as Title VII 
claim to the FLSA claim to illuminate the relevant aspect of employ-
ment discrimination, unfair treatment by the employer.74 Fogleman 
illustrated: 
Imagine a Title VII discrimination case in which an employer 
refuses to hire a prospective employee because he thinks that the 
 
ancestor’s, place of origin; or because an individual has the physical, cultural 
or linguistic characteristics of a national origin group.”); see 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1606.1 (2015) (“The [EEOC] defines national origin discrimination 
broadly.”); see also infra Part III.A. 
65. Arsham, 85 F. Supp. 3d at 845. See also infra Part IV.B. 
66. Nos. 12-CV-15470, 2015 WL 5358093 (E.D. Mich. June 18, 2015). 
67. Id. at *4. 
68. Id.  
69. Id. 
70. 283 F.3d 561 (3rd Cir. 2002).  
71. Id. at 570 (holding that “perception of retaliation” is covered under the 
National Labor Relations Act, whereby the Plaintiff did not engage in retail-
ation although the defendant mistakenly thought he did). 
72. Id. at 564. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. at 571. 
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applicant is a Muslim. The employer is still discriminating on the 
basis of religion even if the applicant he refuses to hire is not in 
fact a Muslim. What is relevant is that the applicant, whether 
Muslim or not, was treated worse than he otherwise would have 
been for reasons prohibited by the statute.75 
Fogleman has been cited with approval for Title VII perceived-as 
claims, notably in Kallabat and Ashram, two of the most recent cases.76 
2. Courts that Do Not Recognize Perceived-As Claims 
There are still numerous district courts that do not recognize 
perceived-as discrimination claims under Title VII.77 In 2004, Butler v. 
Potter was the first case to hold that Title VII does not prohibit 
perceived-as national origin discrimination as a matter of law.78 Other 
courts cited to Butler and dismissed perceived-as Title VII claims.79 
Jesse Butler worked as a mail carrier in Anderson County, 
Tennessee.80 He was adversely affected at work by “a 
supervisor . . . [who] periodically screamed obscenities at him and 
accused him of being Indian or Middle Eastern.”81 Butler noted that it 
was “undisputed that [P]laintiff is neither of Indian nor Middle Eastern 
origin; he is a white Caucasian.”82 The court held that Butler did not 
 
75. Id. 
76. Kallabat v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., Nos. 12-CV-15470, 2015 WL 5358093, at *4 
(E.D. Mich. June 18, 2015); Arsham v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 85 
F. Supp. 3d 841, 848 (D. Md. 2015). 
77. See supra notes 44–46. 
78. Id. at 850. 
79. El v. Max Daetwyler Corp., No. 3:09CV415, 2011 WL 1769805, at *1 
(W.D.N.C. May 9, 2011) aff’d, 451 F. App’x 257 (4th Cir. 2011); Lewis v. 
North General Hosp., 502 F. Supp. 2d 390, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Yousif v. 
Landers McClarty Olathe KS, LLC, No. 12-2788-CM, 2013 WL 5819703, at 
*3 (D. Kan. Oct. 29, 2013); Burrage v. FedEx Freight, Inc., No. 4:10CV2755, 
2012 WL 1068794, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2012); Uddin v. Universal 
Avionics Sys. Corp., Civil Action File No. 1:05-CV-1115-TWT, 2006 WL 
1835291, at *6 (N.D. Ga. 2006). See also Berrios v. Hampton Bays Union 
Free Sch. Dist., No. CV 02-3124, 2007 WL 778165, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 
2007) (holding that a perceived-as claim under Title VII was not a likely 
cognizable theory, yet allowing jury instructions that may find for perceived-
as or actual religious discrimination). See generally Williams, supra note 38, 
for a more thorough analysis of Berrios, and religion misperception under 
Title VII in general. 
80. Butler, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 846. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
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have a Title VII claim since he was not discriminated against based on 
his actual national origin identity.83 
In Uddin v. Universal Avionics System Corporation, the court cited 
to Butler for the proposition that perceived-as claims fail as a matter 
of law, and must be dismissed.84 Zaheer Uddin brought an employment 
discrimination claim for being perceived-as belonging to a particular 
national origin.85 Uddin’s claim failed because he was not actually 
Middle Eastern, as his employer erroneously perceived. However, Uddin 
held that “because Plaintiff in actuality has a dark complexion and is 
a Muslim, Plaintiff may pursue a claim for discriminatory termination 
based on his skin color and his religion.”86 
In Burrage v. FedEx Freight Inc.,87 a man of mixed race was dis-
riminated against at his workplace based on the mistaken belief that he 
was of Mexican descent.88 Nathanial Burrage brought a Title VII claim 
and argued that the harassment, name calling, and racist epithets con-
tinued at FedEx for over three years and “increase[ed] in frequency over 
that period at a rate of anywhere from three times a week to once 
daily.”89 Regardless of the potentially severe discrimination that could 
have been shown at trial, the court granted FedEx’s motion for sum-
mary judgment because Burrage’s actual race was not the one for which 
he was discriminated.90 
Courts that do not recognize perceived-as claims under Title VII 
cite the lack of “regarded as” perception language that exists in other 
federal antidiscrimination statutes.91 Yet, the same courts fall short of 
 
83. Id. at 850. 
84. Uddin, 2006 WL 1835291, at *6. 
85. Id. at *1. 
86. Id. at *6. See infra notes 181–187 and accompanying text. 
87. No. 4:10CV2755, 2012 WL 1068794 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2012). 
88. Id. at *2. 
89. Id.  
90. Id. at *6. 
91. See Yousif v. Landers McClarty Olathe KS, LLC, No. 12-2788-CM, 2013 WL 
5819703, at *3 (D. Kan. Oct. 29, 2013) (“Unlike these other Acts, Title VII 
contains no language regarding the protection of those who are perceived to 
be members of a protected class.”); Lewis v. North General Hosp., 502 F. Supp. 
2d 390, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“If Congress had wanted to permit a similar 
cause of action under Title VII for ‘perceived religion’ discrimination, it could 
have so provided. It did not.”); Butler v. Potter, 345 F. Supp. 2d 844, 850 
(E.D. Tenn. 2004) (explaining that Congress “knows how to enact legislation 
that protects persons who are wrongly perceived to be in a protected class” 
but did not in Title VII); Burrage, 2012 WL 1068794, at *5 (“Title VII contains 
no provision for those wrongly perceived to be of a certain national origin.”).  
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analyzing the similarities and differences between the language and 
history of Title VII and the other statutes.92 
II. Lacking Persuasion: Future Perceived-As Cases 
Should Not Follow Courts That Impose an  
Actuality Requirement 
Courts that currently do not recognize perceived-as claims under 
Title VII should not be given deference as persuasive authority. First, 
some of the perceived-as conclusions were reached in dicta. Second, in 
Butler v. Potter, the employer had actual knowledge of the Plaintiff’s 
actual national origin, diminishing the need to hold the employer liable. 
In Yousif v. Landers,93 the Plaintiff’s perceived-as claim failed be-
cause the he did not “state in his complaint or the EEOC charge that 
he [was] Middle-Eastern—or, in the alternative—that he is not, and 
that defendants perceived him as such.”94 Yousif granted the defen-
dant’s motion for summary judgment, since the Plaintiff did not satisfy 
the EEOC requirements.95 In dicta, however, Yousif also stated that 
“regardless” of the nature of the complaint form, Title VII does not 
recognize perceived-as claims as a matter of law, citing to Butler.96 But 
because Yousif hinged on administrative requirements and not the 
Plaintiff’s identity, this dicta should not be persuasive for future 
perceived-as claims. 
Similarly, a North Carolina district court stated in dicta that 
perceived-as claims fail as a matter of law under Title VII.97 El v. Max 
Daetwyler Corporation98 granted the defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment because there were no facts indicating that the Plaintiff, 
Darryl El, could have been objectively perceived-as being Muslim, as 
he alleged.99 Ashram v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, also in the 
 
92. See Burrage, 2012 WL 1068794, at *5 (comparing the language of Title VII 
and the ADA, with no mention of legislative history); see also Greene, supra 
note 50, at 116 (discussing how courts do not acknowledge the similarities of 
the “substantive provisions” of the ADA and Title VII); infra Part III.B. 
93. No. 12-2788-CM, 2013 WL 5819703 (D. Kan. Oct. 29, 2013). 
94. Id. at *3. 
95. Id. See also Ransom v. U.S. Postal Serv., 170 F. App’x 525, 527 (10th 
Cir. 2006) (holding that a plaintiff must exhaust EEOC administrative 
remedies before bringing a Title VII claim). 
96. Yousif, 2013 WL 5819703, at *3. 
97. El v. Max Daetwyler Corp., No. 3:09CV415, 2011 WL 1769805, at *6 
(W.D.N.C. May 9, 2011) aff’d, 451 F. App’x 257 (4th Cir. 2011). 
98. No. 3:09CV415, 2011 WL 1769805 (W.D.N.C. May 9, 2011) aff’d, 451 F. 
App’x 257 (4th Cir. 2011). 
99. Id. at *6. See also infra Part V. 
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Fourth Circuit, found the court’s reasoning unpersuasive and declined 
to follow El.100 
Butler v. Potter is distinguishable from other perceived-as cases 
because the employer had actual knowledge that Butler was not a mem-
ber of a protected class.101 Butler himself told his employer that he was 
“not of Arab, Indian, or Middle Eastern descent” when he was asked 
about the origin of his “prominent nose.”102 Thus, Butler should not be 
persuasive because his employer had actual knowledge that Butler was 
not protected when Butler told him that he was not Arab or Middle 
Eastern.103 Once Butler told his employer, the employer ceased to per-
ceive him as such. Thus, the defendant had actual knowledge rather 
than a mistaken perception or an assumption, unlike many succeeding 
perceived-as cases.104 It may be significant to note that Butler does not 
cite to Perkins or any other cases that come to the opposite conclusion, 
for persuasive authority.105 
III.  Perceived-As Claims Under EEOC  
Guidance & ADA Analysis 
The statutory language of Title VII is silent on whether perceived-
as claims are protected. However, the EEOC recognizes perceived-as 
discrimination claims under Title VII.106 The EEOC is responsible for 
promulgating regulations and guidelines under Title VII, in addition to 
playing an influential role in employment discrimination claims and 
litigation.107 Another federal antidiscrimination statute, the ADA, is 
 
100. Although the Fourth Circuit affirmed El, it was an unpublished opinion and 
therefore not controlling. See Arsham v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 85 
F. Supp. 3d 841, 849 (D. Md. 2015) (explaining that “[u]npublished opinions 
are not binding precedent”) (citations omitted). See also infra notes 113–116 
and accompanying text. 
101. Butler v. Potter, 345 F. Supp. 2d 844, 850 (E.D. Tenn. 2004). 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. See Part IV.B.2. 
105. Butler, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 850 (rationalizing that “[n]either party has cited 
any controlling authority which would permit a claim for perceived race or 
national origin discrimination and this Court is unaware of any such 
precedent”). 
106. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
107. The agency plays an important role in employment discrimination litigation, 
as plaintiffs are first required to go through the agency’s investigation and 
settlement procedures before a Title VII claim may be brought. The EEOC 
may also bring a claim on behalf of the government against the employer. 
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4; Authority and Role, EEOC, http://eeoc.gov/eeoc 
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similar in purpose to Title VII and recognizes perceived-as discri-
mination claims. The EEOC’s interpretations and the ADA’s existing 
jurisprudence may serve as legal guidance for proceeding with 
perceived-as discrimination claims under Title VII. 
A. No Doubt: The EEOC’s Interpretation of Title VII is  
Entitled to Deference 
Analysis of the EEOC definitions of protected classes may be an 
essential step in determining the scope of perceived-as discrimination 
under Title VII.108 The EEOC guidelines and regulations should be 
given deference for perceived-as claims because Title VII does not pro-
vide definitions for race, national origin and color.109 The EEOC defines 
religion, color, race and national origin broadly.110 An EEOC regulation 
may be interpreted as including perceived-as claims.111 Further, the 
EEOC guidelines expressly provide that perceived-as discrimination is 
prohibited under Title VII.112 
Ashram v. City Council of Baltimore deferred to the EEOC’s policy 
guidelines and regulations while recognizing a perceived-as national 
origin discrimination claim.113 The EEOC guidelines explicitly discuss 
“perception discrimination” claims under Title VII.114 The Guidelines 
state that Title VII prohibits “harassing or otherwise discriminating 
because of the perception or belief that a person is a member of a par-
ticular racial, national origin, or religious group whether or not that 
perception is correct.115 Arsham explained that recognizing perceived-as 
claims under Title VII is a “long standing interpretation” and thus, 
EEOC’s interpretation should be given deference.116 
The EEOC guidelines further explain that if an employer fails to 
hire a Hispanic person because the employer mistakenly thought he or 
 
/index.cfm [https://perma.cc/W9FV-VCDQ] (last visited Feb. 29, 2016) 
(both explaining the duties of the EEOC under Title VII). 
108. Arsham v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 85 F. Supp. 3d 841, 846 (D. Md. 
2015). 
109. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4. 
110. See supra Part I.A. 
111. See infra Part III.A. 
112. Id. 
113. Arsham, 85 F. Supp. at 846. 
114. Employment Discrimination Based on Religion, Ethnicity, or Country of 
Origin, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/fs-relig_ethnic.cfm [https:// 
perma.cc/6KNA-XMZQ] (last visited Mar. 14, 2016). 
115. Id. (emphasis added). 
116. Id. 
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she was Pakistani, the employer is still liable under Title VII.117 Another 
example of unlawful discrimination in the EEOC guidelines is a Sikh 
man who suffered adverse employment actions because he was mis-
takenly perceived-as Muslim because of his turban.118 
Scholars and courts have argued that the EEOC guidelines should 
be given deference when interpreting perceived-as claims because they 
are persuasive and address gaps left by the statutory language.119 The 
EEOC guidelines are “entitled to respect . . . but only to the extent 
that those interpretations have the ‘power to persuade.”120 Yousif v. 
Landers held that the EEOC guidelines for perceived-as claims are not 
persuasive because of the “explicit language” of Title VII and “clear 
case law” pointing to the opposite reasoning.121 Yousif’s reason for disre-
garding the EEOC’s interpretation are unpersuasive because Title VII 
also lacks “explicit language” defining other categories such as national 
origin, race, or color; categories with a history of courts hearing 
perceived-as claims based on them.122 In addition, describing perceived-
as claims as having been rejected by “clear case law” is at best an 
overstatement when one considers the number of district courts that 
have recognized such claims.123 
Although the EEOC guidelines do not constitute binding authority, 
they are persuasive guidance for recognizing perceived-as claims under 
Title VII. Specifically, the EEOC’s definition on national origin discri-
mination may be interpreted as covering perceived-as claims.124 29 




119. See Dallan F. Flake, Religious Discrimination Based on Employer 
Misperception, 2016 Wis. L. Rev. 87, 106 (2016) (“The EEOC’s position on 
misperception discrimination is critical because, although nonbinding, courts 
often defer to the Commission on matters of Title VII interpretation.”); see 
also Espinoza v. Farrah Manufacturing, 414 U.S. 86, 94 (1973) (explaining 
that the EEOC is entitled to deference). 
120. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 585 (holding that agency guide-
lines do not get as much deference as official agency rules because they are 
not subject to the notice and comment process). But see Arsham v. Mayor 
& City Council of Balt., 85 F. Supp. 3d 841, 847 (D. Md. 2015) (“EEOC’s 
guidelines were adopted after promulgation of proposed, revised guidelines 
and receipt and incorporation of public comments.”). 
121. Yousif v. Landers McClarty Olathe KS, LLC, 2013 WL 5819703, at *4 (D. 
Kan. Oct. 29, 2013). 
122. See supra Part III.A. 
123. See supra Part I.B.1. 
124. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
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Including, but not limited to, the denial of equal employment 
opportunity because of an individual’s, or his or her ancestor’s, 
place of origin; or because an individual has the physical, cultural 
or linguistic characteristics of a national origin group.125 
This definition may be interpreted to protect individuals who are discri-
minated against because of a stereotype of a national origin, even if the 
stereotype does not match their actual identity.126 It is evident that the 
EEOC interprets § 1606.1 as protecting perceived-as claims under Title 
VII because of its subsequent clarifying guidelines.127 Further, courts 
that recognize perceived-as claims cite to the EEOC guidelines and reg-
ulations for this proposition.128 
The EEOC has “a body of experience and informed judgment [of 
the pervasiveness and harm of employment discrimination] which 
courts and litigants may properly [defer to] for guidance.”129 Ashram 
deferred to the EEOC’s guidelines because the guidelines were revised 
after a public notice-and-comment opportunity, which “evidence[s] the 
thoroughness of EEOC’s consideration.”130 
The EEOC received 46,800 claims of employment discrimination 
based on color, religion, national origin, and race in 2015.131 This ex-
pertise and exposure may demonstrate EEOC’s awareness of Title VII’s 
intent: to prohibit the unfavorable, discriminatory treatment an indivi-
dual endured because of prejudiced behavior by their employer.132 
 
125. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (2015). I emphasized “a national origin” in the EEOC 
definition to demonstrate that the discrimination may be based on any 
national origin characteristics that the plaintiff is believed to possess, 
regardless of whether that belief is mistaken. 
126. Arsham v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 85 F. Supp. 3d 841, 846 (D. Md. 
2015). 
127. Employment Discrimination, supra note 114. 
128. Arsham, 85 F. Supp. 3d at 846; LaRocca v. Precision Motorcars, Inc., 45 F. 
Supp. 2d 762, 769 (D. Neb. 1999); EEOC v. WC&M Enterprises, Inc., 496 
F.3d 393, 401 (5th Cir. 2007); Perkins v. Lake Cty. Dep’t of Util., 860 F. 
Supp 1262, 1272 (N.D. Ohio 1994). 
129. Arsham, 85 F. Supp. 3d at 847 (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 
165 (1944)). 
130. Id. at 847. 
131. Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2015, EEOC, http://eeoc.gov/eeoc 
/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm [https://perma.cc/FB5U-8P94] (last 
visited Mar. 14, 2016). 
132. See Arsham, 85 F. Supp. 3d at 846 (citing Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, 
LP, 562 U.S. 170, 177–79 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“EEOC’s 
statements in its Compliance Manual merit judicial deference as to 
interpretation of language in Title VII.”)); see also Melissa Hart, Skepticism 
and Expertise: The Supreme Court and the EEOC, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 
1937, 1952 (explaining that through the 1972 amendment, Congress gave 
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Additionally, courts have recognized and cited to § 1606.1, demon-
strating approval, or at least acquiescence to the EEOC’s interpretation 
of national origin discrimination.133 
B. Striking Similarity: Title VII Compared to the ADA 
The ADA is a federal statute, similar to Title VII in language and 
analysis, that prohibits employment discrimination based on dis-
ability.134 ADA language, legislative history, and case law may be help-
ful methods in determining how to evaluate perceived-as claims under 
Title VII. 
The ADA, as amended, defines disability as: “(A) a physical or 
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life act-
ivities of [an] individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) 
being regarded as having such an impairment.”135 An individual is pro-
tected if they fit into this “qualified individual with a disability” define-
tion.136 The “regarded as” definition under the ADA protects individuals 
who are perceived to have a disability and are discriminated against 
based on that perception.137 
 
more responsibility to the EEOC, citing to the complexity of employment 
discrimination law); supra notes 114–115 and accompanying text.  
133. See Arsham, 85 F. Supp. 3d at 846; Eriksen v. Allied Waste Sys., Inc., No. 
06-13549, 2007 WL 1003851, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 2, 2007) (using EEOC 
guidelines to explain that “proof of national origin discrimination is not based 
on the actual national origin of the plaintiff, but rather on the perceived 
characteristics of the plaintiff leading the alleged discriminator to treat the 
plaintiff differently”); see also Williams, supra note 38, at 372 (arguing that 
“[t]here is danger in assuming that the Uddin, Butler, Lewis and Berrios 
courts considered the EEOC’s guidance unpersuasive where the courts 
remain[ed] utterly silent in that regard”); supra note 113, 124 and 
accompanying text. 
134. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012). The ADA was lauded as the “emancipation 
proclamation” for over 40 million Americans with disabilities. Edmund 
Newton, Disabled: The Battle Goes On, L.A. Times (Aug. 16, 1990), 
http://articles.latimes/1990-08-16/news/vw-1210_1_civil-right [https:// 
perma.cc./TZY4-FPX4]. See also infra notes 142–148. See generally Craig 
Robert Senn, Perception Over Reality: Extending the ADA’s Concept of 
“Regarded As” Protection under Federal Employment Discrimination Law, 
36 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 827 (2009) (arguing that the “regarded as” prong 
should extend to Title VII and the ADEA claims). 
135. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2012) (emphasis added). 
136. See id. 
137. Id. 
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The “regarded as” prong under the ADA may be thought of as 
protecting two distinct classes of individuals.138 First, the “regarded as” 
definition protects those who may have a non-limiting impairment that 
would otherwise not fit the definition of disability.139 Second, individuals 
may bring a disability discrimination claim if they do not have any 
impairment, yet are regarded as such.140 Individuals “regarded as” 
having disabilities are protected under the ADA because the discrimina-
tion “substantially limit[s] that person’s ability to work . . . because of 
the prejudiced attitudes or the ignorance of others.” 141 
The fundamental purpose of Title VII and the ADA are the same: 
to protect individuals from invidious discrimination in the workplace 
because of how they are perceived by their employers.142 The history of 
both statutes demonstrates a “striking similarity . . . as to terminology 
and concerns regarding erroneous perception-based or stereotype-based 
discrimination.” 143 For example, there are common terms used through-
out the legislative histories of both the ADA and Title VII including 
 
138. Dale Larson, Unconsciously Regarded as Disabled: Implicit Bias and the 
Regarded-As Prong of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 56 U.C.L.A. L. 
Rev. 451, 485 (2009). 
139. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2012). See also EEOC v. Resources for Human Dev., 
Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 688 (E.D. La. 2011) (ADA protects against 
discrimination based on obesity, because the Plaintiff’s obesity was regarded 
as having other substantial impairments that in fact, did not exist); Mendoza 
v. City of Palacios, 962 F. Supp. 2d 868, 873 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (ADA 
prohibits discrimination based on an employee being regarded as having high 
blood pressure); Scott v. Presbyterian Hosp., No. 3:11CV383, 2012 WL 
4846753, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 11, 2012) (holding “regarded as” ADA 
protects against discrimination for past drug abuse); Sharona Hoffman, The 
Importance of Immutability in Employment Discrimination Law, 52 Wm. & 
Mary L. Rev. 1493–97 (explaining impairments which would now be 
covered under the ADA including cancer, diabetes, and learning disabilities). 
140. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(c) (2012); Larson, supra note 138, at 485. 
141. Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 278–85 (1987). Although the court 
applied this principle to Section 504, this is a milestone case for federal 
employment discrimination statutes because this is one of the first cases that 
focuses on the discriminatory treatment of the plaintiff, rather than the 
identity of the plaintiff. See Larson, supra note 138, at 458–59 (“Again, the 
focus here is on the actions–more specifically, on the ‘reflexive reactions’– of 
the employer when determining whether an employee is [covered].”). See infra 
Part V. 
142. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e & § 12101 (2012). See also Craig Robert Senn, Perception 
Over Reality: Extending the ADA’s Concept of “Regarded As” Protection 
under Federal Employment Discrimination Law, 36 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 
827, 854–55 (2009) (arguing that “regarded as” analysis under the ADA 
should be applied to Title VII and the ADEA). 
143. See Senn, supra note 142, at 854. 
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“assumption,” “view,” “stereotype,” and “belief.”144 Congress compared 
Title VII to the ADA during the Title VII 1991 amendment hearings. 
Congress explained that discrimination based on race, sex, national 
origin, religion, or disability “has no place in employment decisions.”145 
This legislative history demonstrates that the purpose and intent of 
Title VII and the ADA are intertwined, and thus may be probative 
when comparing the two statutes.  
The analysis of ADA claims is not which impairment should qualify 
as a disability, but rather the “substantive questions of discrimination” 
that the individual experienced.146 The ADA focuses on “the external 
actions of the employer” and the 2008 amendment reinstated that 
“discrimination by an employer is in itself debilitating.”147 Scholars have 
noted that the ADA and Title VII share an “identical congressional and 
judicial philosophy of imposing liability upon employers for erroneous 
perception-based or stereotype-based discrimination.”148 The “regarded 
as” prong prohibits discrimination based on “myths, fears, and stereo-
types associated with disability.”149 Similarly, Title VII prohibits dis-
crimination based on stereotypes or characteristics associated with a 
particular protected class.150 
 
144. Id. 
145. H.R. Rep. No. 102-40(I), at 14 (1991), as reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
549, 552 (Comm. on Education and Labor). See also Senn, supra note 142, 
at 856. 
146. Hoffman, supra note 139, at 1500 (“The ADAAA will shift the analysis away 
from the disability question to more substantive questions of discrimination 
and spare plaintiffs the indignity of having their cases dismissed because 
courts do not deem them disabled enough to merit legal protection.”). 
147. Larson, supra note 138, at 467 (emphasis added). 
148. Senn, supra note 142, at 854 (“When enacting the ADA . . . Congress 
repeatedly referred to concerns about combating ‘myths, fears and 
stereotypes,’ ‘generalizations,’ ‘presumptions,’ ‘prejudging,’ ‘preconceived 
and . . . erroneous judgment . . . based on “labeling,”’ ‘negative attitudes,’ 
‘misconceptions,’ ‘unfounded, outmoded stereotypes and perceptions,’ ‘false 
presumptions, . . . misperceptions, patronizing attitudes, ignorance, irrational 
fears, and pernicious mythologies,’ and ‘stereotypical assumptions.’”). See 
also Greene, supra note 50, at 116–17 (explaining that “some courts have 
simply dismissed the fact that employers’ subjective perceptions, related 
animus, stigmatization, are the impetuses for resulting [discrimination]”); 
Williams, supra note 38, at 371 (“Allowing claims of discrimination rooted 
in an employer's misperception is consistent with both the purpose and the 
logic of Title VII.”); Flake, supra note 119, at 106 (explaining the EEOC’s 
position that misperception discrimination constitutes discrimination under 
Title VII). 
149. H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3 at 30 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 453. 
150. See supra notes 124–128 and accompanying text. See also Price Waterhouse 
v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (holding discrimination based on gender 
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Courts that require an actuality requirement reason that Title VII 
does not cover perceived-as claims because Congress demonstrated that 
it is aware, through the ADA, “that it knows how to enact legislation 
that protects persons who are wrongly perceived to be in a protected 
class.”151 It follows that Congress intentionally excluded “regarded as” 
language for Title VII, and thus “the explicit language in Title 
VII . . . stand[s] for the opposite proposition [of including perceived-as 
claims].”152  
However, unlike the ADA, Title VII language is ambiguous on who 
it protects.153 Although there is no explicit language for perceived-as 
discrimination, there are also no explicit definitions for any of the pro-
tected classes that Title VII covers.154 Conversely, the ADA defines a 
clear class of individuals who are protected under the statute.155 Title 
VII is also unclear on perceived-as coverage because it does not specify 
whether the prohibited religious discrimination is merely “because of” 
 
stereotypes to be covered under Title VII). This Note does not discuss the 
potential for perceived-as sex discrimination claims. Such analysis may 
become necessary since as discrimination claims based on sexual orientation 
or gender identity arise. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575 
(6th Cir. 2004) (holding that Title VII covers discrimination for gender non-
conforming behavior); see also Hoffman, supra note 139, at 1526–28 
(explaining the recent advancements in transgender cases under Title VII). 
See generally Andrew Gilden, Toward a More Transformative Approach: 
The Limits of Transgender Formal Equality, 23 Berkeley J. Gender L. 
& Just. 83, 95–102 (2008) (analyzing transgender sex-stereotyping claims). 
151. Yousif v. Landers McClarty Olathe KS, LLC, 2013 WL 5819703, at *4 (D. 
Kan. Oct. 29, 2013). Other courts that do not recognize perceived-as claims 
under Title VII used the same reasoning. See El v. Max Daetwyler Corp., 
2011 WL 1769805, at *7 (W.D. N.C. May 9, 2011) (“While a perception that 
a person is suffering from a disability is actionable under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, it does not appear that Title VII recognizes such a claim.”); 
Lewis v. North General Hosp., 502 F. Supp. 2d 390, 401 (S.D.N.Y.2007) 
(“[T]he protections of Title VII do not extend to persons who are merely 
"perceived" to belong to a protected class.”); Burrage v. FedEx Freight, Inc., 
2012 WL 1068794, at *9 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2012) (“It is true that Title 
VII protects only those who are actually in a protected class, and not those 
who are perceived to be in a protected class.”); Butler v. Potter, 345 F. Supp. 
2d 844, 850 (E.D. Tenn. 2004) (“[Congress] knows how to enact legislation 
that protects persons who are wrongly perceived to be in a protected class.”). 
152. Yousif, 2013 WL 5819703, at *4. 
153. Williams, supra note 38, at 369 (explaining that since Title VII is ambiguous 
on its face on whether perceived as claims are prohibited, the next step to 
determine this answer is to go through the “purpose and logic” of the 
statute.). 
154. See supra Part I. 
155. See supra notes 135–137 and accompanying text. 
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a religion or “because of” the plaintiff’s actual religion.156 Since there is 
ambiguity in Title VII that does not exist in the ADA, statutory lan-
guage alone may be insufficient for determining whether perceived-as 
discrimination claims may be brought.157 
Although it may be argued by excluding “perceived-as” language 
was intentional, a strict textualist reading of Title VII may ignore 
broader Congressional objectives. Interpreting Title VII narrowly to ex-
clude perceived-as claims also ignores the “duty of the courts” to ensure 
the protection under Title VII and that Congressional intent, “is not 
hampered by a combination of strict construction of the statute and a 
battle with semantics.”158 Thus, it is vital for courts and litigants to 
also focus on the broader purpose of eradicating substantive workplace 
discrimination.  
Moreover, sociological views of race and identity have changed since 
the most recent amendment of Title VII,159 just like current views of 
disability changed from the enactment to the amendment of the 
ADA.160 It is possible that Congress is unaware of the actuality require-
ment developed by some courts to narrow Title VII’s scope.161 To avoid  
156. See Senn, supra note 134 at 860. See also EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch 
Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2032 (2015) (holding that the “because of” 
language does not require a plaintiff to prove the defendant’s actual 
knowledge); infra notes 235–241 and accompanying text. 
157. See Williams, supra note 38, at 370 (explaining that “if the statute is 
ambiguous, the statute’s meaning is determined based on broader arguments 
of purpose and logic”) (citing Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 
(1997)). 
158. Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888, 891 (5th Cir. 1970). See 
Greene, supra note 50, at 122 (explaining that the “court’s ultimate 
denial . . . in misperception discrimination cases in no way constitutes an 
embrace of this judicial charge to interpret broadly Title VII in furtherance 
of the statute’s goals and meaning so that Title VII ‘works’”). 
159. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
160. Darlene D. Unger, Employer’s Attitudes Towards Persons with Disabilities 
in the Workforce: Myths or Realities?, 17 Focus on Autism & Other 
Developmental Disabilities 1 (2002) (noting a societal trend of 
perceiving disability from a medical model to the “present emphasis on 
capabilities, choice, and workplace supports in maximizing the work 
potential of people with disabilities”); Cecilia Capuzzi Simon, Disability 
Studies: A New Normal, N.Y. Times (Nov. 1, 2013), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2013/11/03/education/edlife/disability-studies-a-new-
normal.html [https://perma.cc/CVW3-52XV] (explaining that terminology 
and acceptance of disability is changing, partially because of the ADA, “that 
foreboding forecast is driving growth in disability studies, a field that didn’t 
even exist 20 years ago”). 
161. See infra note 175 and accompanying text. Unlike the ADA, there are no 
Supreme Court cases demonstrating a need to amend Title VII in order to 
proscribe regarded-as discrimination. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 
Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, sec. 2(a)(4) (2008) (the purpose of the 
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barring more valid employment discrimination claims until an 
amendment, Title VII should continue to be interpreted to prohibit 
perceived-as discrimination.162 
IV. Deceptively Complex: Why Discrimination Based 
on Appearance and Bias Should Be Protected 
Under Title VII. 
Employment “[d]iscrimination stems from a reliance on immaterial 
outward appearances that stereotype an individual with imagined, 
usually undesirable, characteristics thought to be common to members 
of the group that shares these superficial traits.”163 This bias and dis-
crimination based on appearance may cause a hostile work environ-
ment, regardless of if an individual is a member of the protected classes 
that is known for these stereotypical traits and appearance. For various 
individuals, it may be difficult for others, and even the individual 
herself, to define and prove their identity to a protected class. 
Recognizing perceived-as claims will refocus Title VII analysis from a 
rigid construction of identity to the actual, substantive discrimination 
faced in the workplace.164 
A. The Difficulty of Defining and Proving Identity of a Protected Class 
Discrimination based on an individual’s appearance characteristics 
should be proscribed, regardless of whether those characteristics 
correctly or stereotypically correlate with a protected class under Title 
VII. 
Protected classes under Title VII are generally based on specific 
immutable characteristics.165 Traditionally, immutable characteristics 
are thought of as “accidents of birth,” such as skin color, race, face 
shape, some physical disabilities, gender, and any other physical trait 
that cannot be easily changed.166 However, some courts have rejected 
 
amendment is to respond to Supreme Court cases that “narrowed the broad 
scope of protection intended to be afforded by the ADA”); see also Greene, 
supra note 50. 
162. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
163. Bennun v. Rutgers State Univ., 941 F.2d 154, 173 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding 
that Plaintiff was protected under Title VII, although he was Argentine and 
not ethnically Hispanic). 
164. See Greene, supra note 50, at 130 (explaining the actuality requirement). 
165. Id. at 120 (“[T]he legal construction of immutability and the protected class 
approach is entrenched in antidiscrimination law.”). 
166. Hoffman, supra note 139, at 1511 (listing examples of immutable 
characteristics such as gender, mental disability, or age). Although immutable 
characteristics may include an unchangeable trait, visible or not, this Note 
focuses only on objectively noticeable traits. There are immutable, physical 
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this definition in favor of a more inclusive definition of immutable 
characteristics, as traits that are “beyond the power of an individual to 
change” or a trait that is so “fundamental to identity or conscious[ness] 
that it is effectively unalterable.”167 Discrimination based on immutable 
traits that lead employers to mistakenly perceive an individual as a 
certain race, ethnicity, or religion should be unlawful under Title VII. 
1. What is Identity? The Social Construct of Race, Color, Religion, 
and National Origin 
Perceived-as discrimination should be prohibited under Title VII 
because it encompasses the real-life difficulty of defining and explaining 
identities such as race, religion, national origin, and color.168 An actua-
lity requirement ignores the well-accepted theory of identity as a social 
construct.169 
Social construction theories acknowledge that genetics alone do not 
determine racial or ethnic identity. Rather, race and other protected 
identities are socially constructed from stereotypes, bias, experience, 
and presentment.170 If the definition of race were merely the color of 
skin, the origin of the individual, or a genetic formula, it would be 
superfluous for Title VII to prohibit discrimination based on race and 
color.171 Perkins v. Lake County noted that it originally assumed the 
question of whether Perkins was Native American would have a 
“simple . . . straightforward answer.”172 Instead, Perkins concluded that 
it is much too difficult to “categoriz[e] individuals with varied and/or 
 
traits that are not usually associated with discrimination, such as height, eye 
color, blood type, and lefthandness. These traits are not relevant for Title VII 
analysis because they do not typically carry prejudice or stereotypes that 
employers use to discriminate in the workplace. Id. at 1522–37. 
167. Id. at 1517. Courts have always struggled with distinguishing between 
immutable characteristics and what is a personal choice. Id. at 1524. See 
also, Pattison et al., The Squiggly Line: When Should Individual Choices be 
Protected from Employment Discrimination?, 24 S. L.J. 29, 29 (2014) 
(explaining the public policy issues of protecting traits that appear to be 
more of a personal choice). 
168. Perkins v. Lake Cty. Dep’t of Util., 860 F. Supp. 1262, 1271 (N.D. Ohio 1994). 
169. Alicia Fedelina Chávez & Florence Guido-DiBrito, Racial and Ethnic Identity 
and Development, 84 New Directions for Adult and Continuing 
Education 39, 40 (1999). 
170. Id. (“[S]ocial construction . . . ‘refers to a sense of group or collective identity 
based on one’s perception that he or she shares a common heritage with a 
particular racial group.’” (quoting Janet E. Helms, Introduction: Review of 
Racial Identity Terminology, in Black, White Racial Identity: 
Theory, Research, and Practice 3 (Janet E. Helms, ed., 1990))). 
171. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012). 
172. Perkins, 860 F. Supp. at 1271 (N.D. Ohio 1994). 
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unclear ancestry within a particular racial grouping,” especially because 
Perkins and his family self-identified, and objectively appeared, as 
Native American.173 Race and ethnicity are “hierarchical system[s]” that 
classify “based on four or five visible characteristics—such as skin color 
and hair texture—in order to [form bias, and] discriminate.”174 Race and 
ethnicity may be framed as “biological, morphological concepts and dis-
crimination as a reaction to a set of biologically fixed traits.”175 
While identity as a social construct may be widespread in “literary 
and theoretical”176 spheres, courts may still look at race and ethnicity 
as static and fixed identities that fit neatly into particular classifica-
tions.177 It is for this complex reason that, “government or courts [should 
not be] in the business of ‘certifying’ bloodlines and races[.]”178 Thus, 
distinguishing and defining race, ethnicity, and color is such a difficult, 
malleable, and fundamentally individualized concept that courts should 
refrain from enacting rigid and binary definitions.179  
Certain immutable characteristics may trigger schemas that cause 
an observer to associate that visible trait with a certain race, ethnicity, 
or religion.180 Because everyone, consciously or not, associates 
 
173. Id. (explaining that “the issue of membership in a given racial classification 
is deceptively complex . . . by the amorphous definition of the term ‘race’”). 
174. Tia Ghose, The Science of Race: Why Rachel Dolezal Can’t Choose to Be 
Black, Live Science (June 17, 2015), http://www.livescience.com/51245-
what-is-ethnicity-racial-identity.html [https://perma.cc/TJ77-J3W5]. 
175. Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity: Discrimination 
by Proxy and the Future of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1134, 1134 (2004) 
(emphasis added). Race as social construct is a relatively new concept. See 
Chávez & Guido-DiBrito, supra note 169, at 41 (explaining that the 
accepted identity theories and models “trace their roots” to work done in 
the 1960–80s); see Priscilla Frank, ‘Black’ Artist Dresses Up As Her ‘White’ 
Ancestors, Revealing The Complexity Of Multiracial Identity, Huffington 
Post (April 14, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/14/stacey-
tyrell-backra-bluid_n_7057086.html [https://perma.cc/3U8L-A65C] (inter-
viewing artist Stacey Tyrell, of mixed-race descent, who creates works that 
demonstrate complexity of race explains that “the binaries that [categories 
create] do not create space for the nuanced relationship that lies between 
them”). 
176. Chávez & Guido-DiBrito, supra note 169, at 40. 
177. Greene, supra note 50, at 135 (“[A] lawyer or judge might outright disbelieve 
that a plaintiff’s race could be mistaken, based on her own preset 
conceptualizations of race and sex as fixed, indisputable constructs.”). 
178. Ortiz v. Bank of America, 547 F. Supp. 550, 559 n.16 (E.D. Cal. 1982). 
179. See id. at 559–60 (emphasizing the court’s desire to not define national origin). 
180. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias 
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 Stan. 
L. Rev. 1161, 1201–02 (1995). See also Chávez & Guido-DiBrito, supra note 
169, at 40. 
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characteristics with a certain identity, it is “essentially impossible for 
any one person to escape being perceived” as a member of one, or many, 
various groups.181 When an individual experiences perception discri-
mination, the bias from the observation is present, whether or not the 
association was wrongful. Since individuals cannot alter how their im-
mutable traits are observed, they should be protected if their employer 
acts adversely based on their observations, whether the employer was 
mistaken about their identity or not. 
For example, hair and skin color are two objective traits that may 
lead an observer to conclude an individual is a member of a certain 
protected class. The plaintiff in Burrage v. Fed-Ex argued that he was 
perceived-as Mexican because of his mixed-race skin color.182 The court 
responded that the evidence of discrimination was not of “color-related 
character or purpose,” so Burrage could not prove color discrimina-
tion.183 Burrage was required to produce evidence that his skin, rather 
than his overall appearance, caused the discriminatory comments.184 A 
flaw with Burrage’s logic is that one stray comment based on his skin 
color would “magically transform non-cognizable claims” in to discrim-
ination prohibited under Title VII.185 For example, what if the plaintiff 
later on discovered that he “was actually of Mexican descent?”186 
Burrage also ignores the inherent role that skin color plays in bias and 
assumption of identity.187 Anne Sears lost her Title VII claim at 
summary judgment because she “merely allege[d] that [she has] curly  
181. Greene, supra note 50, at 128. 
182. Burrage v. FedEx Freight, Inc., No. 4:10CV2755, 2012 WL 1068794, at *4 
(N.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2012) (Burrage alleges in support that “[o]ver the past 
three years he was called, in a derogatory and pervasive manner, the term 
‘Mexican’ by virtue of his brown skin and black hair”). 
183. Id. at *5–7.  
184. Id. at *8. 
185. Greene, supra note 50, at 113. 
186. Id. at 112. But see Afshar v. Pinkerton Acad., No. Civ. 03-137-JD, 2004 WL 
1969873, at *3 n.2 (D. N.H. Sept. 7, 2004) (noting Afshar’s religious 
misperception claim, but concluding that “[f]or purposes of summary 
judgment, that part of Afshar’s claim is indistinguishable from his claim of 
national origin discrimination and is not discussed separately”). 
187. Skin color has always played an (arguably obvious) role in racial identity 
and discrimination. Id. See also Uddin v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp., No. 
1:05-CV-1115-TWT, 2006 WL 1835291, at *1 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (holding that 
plaintiff “with a dark complexion and a beard” has a national origin claim); 
LaRocca v. Precision Motorcars, Inc., 45 F.Supp.2d 762, 770 (D. Neb. 1999) 
(explaining that “the most important characteristic of the plaintiff’s Italian 
descent is his dark brown skin”); Perkins v. Lake Cty. Dep’t of Util., 860 F. 
Supp. 1262, 1273 (N.D. Ohio 1994) (holding that “[i]t is the skin color leading 
to the perception that the person is ‘different’ from the white majority that 
leads to discrimination”). 
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hair and has been asked numerous times what her ethnic background 
was.”188 However, by dismissing her claim at the outset, Sears dis-
regarded the importance of hairstyle and texture in race and ethnicity 
classification, bias, and discrimination.189 
Individuals may attempt to identity and present themselves as be-
longing to a certain group, although transracial theories of identity have 
raised controversy and concern in sociological and racial identity 
politics.190 One reason why transracial theories are controversial is 
because it may be argued that those who present themselves as belong-
ing to a certain race appropriate the culture, and ignore the historical 
barriers that the race has and is continuing to overcome.191 A recent 
example of a white woman identifying as black has brought up national 
debates on transracial theories, and why self-proclamation of race is 
complex and potentially problematic. Rachel Dolezal is an author, a 
former instructor in African-American Studies, a civil rights activist, 
and a former president of a local NAACP branch.192 In 2015, Dolezal 
resigned from her position with the NAACP and lost her job at the 
university because she was discovered to be white, unlike the black 
identity she presented herself as.193 After she was revealed to be white, 
 
188. Sears v. Jo-Ann Stores, Inc., No. 3:12-1322, 2014 WL 1665048, at *7 (M.D. 
Tenn. 2014). 
189. Id. (The plaintiff alleges that she “has very curly hair and has been asked 
numerous times what her ethnic back ground was [and that] [o]ne customer 
described [her] hair as ‘nappy.’”). See Greene, supra note 50, at 1365–70 
(explaining race as a social construct, particularly the history of hair texture 
and style as a basis of racism and bias contemporarily). 
190. See notes 187–189 and accompanying text. 
191. Jelani Cob, Black Like Her: Rachel Dolezal and Our Lies About Race, The 
New Yorker (June 15, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-
comment/rachel-dolezal-black-like-her [https://perma.cc/W2T9-ACNV]. 
192. Jessica Elgot, Civil Rights Activist Rachel Dolezal Misrepresented Herself as 
Black, Claim Parents, The Guardian (June 12, 2015), https://www. 
theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/12/civil-rights-activist-rachel-dolezal-
misrepresented-herself-as-black-claim-parents [https://perma.cc/NAT7-FF47]. 
193. See Kirk Johnson, Richard Pérez-Peña & John Eligon, Rachel Dolezal, in 
Center of Storm, Is Defiant: ‘I Identify as Black,’ N.Y. Times (June 16, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/17/us/rachel-dolezal-nbc-today-
show.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/5P9P-RLWX]; see also Chris McGreal, 
Rachel Dolezal: ‘I Wasn’t Identifying as Black to Upset People. I Was Being 
Me,’ The Guardian (Dec. 13, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2015/dec/13/rachel-dolezal-i-wasnt-identifying-as-black-to-upset-
people-i-was-being-me [https://perma.cc/UVM7-KU73] (Dolezal’s interview 
about four months after the discovery of her white race, where she explains 
her idea of identity as socially constructed, and that she did not intend to 
deceive others). 
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she received harsh criticism, and her work in the African-American 
community was disregarded as disingenuous.194  
There is disagreement on whether her self-presentment was a decep-
tive act of cultural appropriation, or a “legitimate transracialism” ident-
ity that challenges the social construct of race.195 This deception is more 
problematic for perceived-as discrimination because most people cannot 
choose their race or ethnicity, yet Dolezal can “become black” and can 
“hide her whiteness at any moment if she wants to.”196 Transracial 
identity theories provide a troublesome issue for perceived-as claims: 
although the individual was actually discriminated against, should they 
still be provided a windfall when the individual themselves deceived the 
employer?197 For this reason, it is most likely necessary for a case-by-
case analysis of all perceived-as claims, taking into account all evidence 
of purposeful deception when determining discrimination liability.  
Individuals differ on whether religion is immutable, or unchanged-
able, usually based on their own belief.198 For example, “[a] secularist 
might deem religion to be alterable, but it is immutable in the world-
view of many devout individuals because it is fundamental to their 
conscience or identity.”199 The belief of whether religion is immutable 
or may be freely changed is “based on [different people’s] world view 
and identity.”200 Religious identity may evolve or change throughout an 
individual’s life, but this should not have any bearing on the fund-
amental or immutable value of religion or religious sincerity.201 
Although a hijab, a last name, or a necklace with a religious symbol 
may not be viewed as an immutable characteristic by some, 
discrimination based on outward appearance or stereotypes may be 
 
194. Id. 
195. Cob, supra note 191. 
196. See Ghose, supra note 174. Professor David Freud explained that “Dolezal is 
probably benefiting from her African American identity without having 
experienced a lifetime of racism, and she can shed her black persona if it 
becomes inconvenient.” Id.  
197.  This is a complicated and evolving issue in social construct identity theory. 
For this reason, the “solution” to purposeful deception in Title VII claims is 
out of the scope of this Note. 
198. Hoffman, supra note 139, at 1516–17. 
199. Id. at 1517. 
200. Id. at 1513. 
201. Id. at 1516 (“Title VII’s prohibition of religious discrimination makes no 
distinction between individuals who never altered their religious affiliation 
and those who have.”). 
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proven by shifting the focus of Title VII analysis to the employer’s 
belief.202  
2. How to Prove Identity 
Considering the difficulty of defining identity, it may be too burden-
some for plaintiffs to be required to proffer evidence of their “actual 
identity” during Title VII litigation. In Perkins v. Lake County, the 
defendant hired an expert witness, and the court concluded that, even 
after all of the research and resources spent, determining national origin 
was not that simple.203 For every perceived-as case, would either party 
have to hire expert witnesses to go through family history and genea-
logical makeup?204 Using ancestry or genetic testing may also be an 
incomplete analysis of race or ethnicity because many other factors and 
traits play a role in the construct of identity. 
In most Title VII cases, proving identity is not an issue because 
both parties concede that the plaintiff is protected.205 However, diffi-
culty arises when a plaintiff’s identity is contested.206 The simplest 
method to assert national origin is a birth certificate or a parent’s birth 
certificate of their national origin. However, proof by birth certificate 
leaves a gap for many national origin discrimination claims because 
Title VII does not require that an individual be directly from a different 
country or have a direct familial connection to a certain nationality to 
be covered.207 
It may also be difficult to prove religion for a discrimination claim 
based on identity, rather than a religious accommodation claim. 208 An  
202. Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes, By Any Other Name?: On 
Being “Regarded As” Black, And Why Title VII Should Apply Even If 
Lakisha and Jamal are White 7 (UC Davis Legal Studies Research Paper 
Series., Paper No. 67, 2005) http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=870048 [https://perma.cc/E4SQ-NGUN] (arguing that the 
ADA “regarded as” analysis should apply to Title VII claims for proxy 
discrimination based on a name). 
203. Perkins v. Lake Cty. Dep’t of Util., 860 F. Supp. 1262, 1273–75 (N.D. Ohio 
1994). See also supra notes 51–57 and accompanying text. 
204. Id. at 1269–70. 
205. See Greene, supra note 50, at 118 (“[A] plaintiff may satisfy an initial prima 
facie element by demonstrating that she is a member of a protected class, 
which generally amounts to a simple attestation by the plaintiff of her 
relevant identity.”). 
206. Id. 
207. See supra notes 125–133, 150 and accompanying text. 
208. See infra Part IV.B.2. Although this was a religious accommodation case, A 
& F is distinguishable from other religious accommodation cases because the 
plaintiff did not seek an accommodation. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch 
Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2032 (2015). The need for accommodation was 
just assumed, so A & F could possibly have categorized as discrimination 
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individual does not have to prove strict compliance with every tenet in 
the religion to be covered under Title VII.209 For example, the Supreme 
Court stated the irrelevancy of knowing a Mosque’s address, praying 
five times a day, or even every day, in a religious discrimination claim 
analysis.210  
In an analogous example, how would a Jewish person, discriminated 
against because of their identity, prove that they belong to the Jewish 
faith? Be able to recite some fundamental prayers? Know the local 
rabbi? What if an individual had dark, curly hair, a prominent nose, 
and the last name “Friedman”? All of those characteristics may stereo-
typically describe a Jewish person. But what if that individual was, in 
fact, not Jewish?  
This same analysis would be relevant for other religious identities 
because there have always been stereotypes of how members of a certain 
religion should appear.211 Particularly in a post 9/11 era, society has, 
“lumped together” different religions and national origins by the stig-
mas and stereotypes associated with their appearances.212 To further 
add to the confusion, some religions identify as an ethnicity, as well as 
a religion.213  
based on religious identity, rather than accommodation. See id. For a 
religious accommodation claim to be required, the practice has to be sincere. 
209. See supra notes 33–38 and accompanying text. 
210. See EEOC. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1284 
(N.D. Okla. 2011), rev’d and remanded, 731 F.3d 1106 (10th Cir. 2013), 
rev’d and remanded, 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015). 
211. See Khaled A. Beydoun, Between Muslim and White: The Legal 
Construction of the Arab American Identity, 69 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. of 
Am. L. 29 (2013) (demonstrating the history of conflation of Arab and 
Muslim identity and how constructed by United States law); Emma Green, 
The Trouble with Wearing Turbans in America, The Atlantic, (Jan. 27, 
2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/01/the-trouble-
with-wearing-turbans-in-america/384832/ [https://perma.cc/Q6T5-EASJ] 
(“Although the faith was founded in India and almost all Sikhs are of Indian 
descent, between 20 and 28 percent of respondents mistakenly labeled 
images of four differently dressed Sikhs as Middle Eastern.”). 
212. Simran Jeet Singh, 9/11-era Ignorance of Islam is Infecting the Age of Isis: 
We Should Know Better, The Guardian (Sept. 9, 2014), 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/sep/09/ignorance-islam-
isis-hate-crimes [https://perma.cc/LWY9-S38A] (“[Society’s] ignorance 
leads us to lump together people from entirely different parts of the world 
(South Asia, the Middle East) and people who practice entirely different 
religions (Islam, Sikhism).”). 
213. See, e.g., Valeriy Chervyakov et al., Religion and Ethnicity: Judaism in the 
Ethnic Consciousness of Contemporary Russian Jews, 20 Ethnic and 
Racial Studies 280, 285 (1997) (explaining that Jews in the Soviet Union 
were considered “member[s] of an ethnic group . . . established exclusively 
by descent”). Soviet Jews were required to have “Jewish” as their nationality 
in the Soviet Union’s internal passport registration. Because of this focus of 
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This standard of proving race, national origin, color, or religion 
“fails to acknowledge” that the stereotypes “an observer uses to assign 
a racial or ethnic identity . . . are experientially shaped by broader 
social forces . . . personal encounters with racial, ethnic, and color class-
ification, and the contexts in which such classifications are made.”214 
Prohibiting perceived-as discrimination limits Title VII analysis to the 
objective belief and actions of employers, rather than delving into com-
plex analysis of identity.  
B. Recognizing Perceived-As Claims Ensures that Employers who 
Engage in Unlawful Discrimination Will Not Be Shielded From Liability 
Interpreting Title VII to prohibit perceived-as discrimination 
achieves the broader goal of eradicating discrimination in the workplace 
by focusing on the discriminatory actions of the employer, rather than 
the complex issue of identity.215 Discrimination based on “external ob-
servations . . . and . . . categorizations are beyond an individual’s 
control” and are the “central basis for pervasive, systematic, and pur-
poseful exclusion of individuals . . . in the American workforce.”216  
1. “Wrong” Discrimination Prohibited under Title VII 
Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against an in-
dividual because of their membership to a protected class, sometimes 
demonstrated from stereotypes based on outward appearance. However, 
the discrimination does not always correlate with an individual’s actual 
identity.217 Courts should not reward the “erroneous discriminator,” 
who makes the wrong stereotypical assumption while holding the 
“accurate discriminator” liable for the same conduct and basis of dis-
crimination.218 
 
Judaism as an ethnicity, rather than a religion, “one could be fully Jewish 
by Soviet lights without having any attachment at all to Judaism.” Id. This 
ethnic identity is also recognized in U.S. law and Title VII. See Sears v. Jo-
Ann Stores, Inc., No. 3:12-1322, 2014 WL 1665048, at * 7–8 (M.D. Tenn. 
2014) (holding that, while not cognizable in this case, individuals may bring 
a claim for being discriminated against for being an ethnic Jew). 
214. Id. See also Greene, supra note 50, at 124. 
215. Larson, supra note 138, at 468–75 (explaining that implicit bias is a “valuable 
jurisprudential corrective”); Greene, supra note 50, at 129. See infra notes 
228–230 and accompanying text. 
216. Greene, supra note 50, at 129. 
217. See supra Part I.B. 
218. Larson, supra note 138, at 856. (“The difference between these employers is 
the accuracy of the perception of protected status—one subset’s employers 
happened to be ‘right,’ while the other subset’s employers happened to be 
‘wrong.’”). 
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Perceived-as claims may not be uniformly recognized because courts 
may believe that stereotypes and discrimination based on a mispercep-
tion are less harmful than discrimination based on an individual’s actual 
identity.219 Yet, discrimination based on a wrongful misperception may 
still create a hostile work environment sufficient to warrant protection 
under Title VII.220 
The employer in Burrage v. Fed-Ex knew of the derogatory name-
calling and the hostile work environment that was so severe, that 
Burrage’s work performance was adversely affected.221 Burrage alleged 
that he experienced discrimination for approximately three years, in-
cluding offensive acts such as refusing to greet him because of his 
Mexican perception, yelling “Andale, Andale” and “Arriba” to him, and 
vulgar graffiti about Mexicans that was directed to him.222 Nonetheless, 
while recognizing the presence of discrimination, the court held that 
Burrage was not entitled to relief because he was not actually 
Mexican.223 This is precisely the type of conduct Title VII was designed 
to protect against. 
Burrage v. Fed-Ex observed that the discrimination Burrage faced 
was “[an] unfortunate employment of offensive stereotypes of 
Hispanics,” yet failed to allow him to proceed on the merits of his 
case.224 Burrage would have been protected by Title VII if his “employer 
uncovered his mixed-race heritage” and discriminated against him on 
that basis, rather than the mistaken belief that he was Mexican.225 This 
type of outcome is unfaithful to the intent of Title VII; that employers 
“may be poor anthropologists” should not determine whether a plain-
tiff’s discrimination claim can be heard.226 It should be irrelevant 
whether an employer correctly stereotyped. 227 
 
219. Greene, supra note 50, at 136–37. 
220. See supra notes 41–48. 
221. Burrage v. FedEx Freight, Inc., 4:10CV2755, 2012 WL 1068794, at *2 (N.D. 
Ohio Mar. 29, 2012) 
222. Id. 
223. Id. at *6. 
224. Id. 
225. See id. See also Greene, supra note 50, at 11; supra notes 182–187 and 
accompanying text. 
226. Manzanares v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 593 F.2d 968, 971 (10th Cir. 1979) 
(holding that Mexican identity may qualify as race for § 1981 purposes). 
227. See, e.g., LaRocca v. Precision Motorcars, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 762, 770 (D. 
Neb. 1999) (“The fact that [co-worker] ignorantly used the wrong derogatory 
ethnic remark toward the plaintiff is inconsequential.”); Wood v. Freeman 
Decorating Servs., Inc., No. 3:08-CV-00375-LRH-RAM, 2010 WL 653764, at 
*4 (D. Nev. Feb. 19, 2010) (“More importantly, even if Defendant’s employees 
mistakenly believed that Plaintiff was American Indian, Defendant may 
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Discrimination is not a precise practice, where an employer first 
determines the exact origin of the unfavored characteristics of an in-
dividual, such as their skin color, hair type, or facial structure, and then 
decides to discriminate based on those identified characteristics.228 
Instead, racial and ethnic bias “occurs when a subject interprets another 
person’s visible, physical features to correlate with a set of features she 
identifies with a certain race or ethnic group.”229 Focusing only on an 
individual’s “actual identity” for a Title VII claim may disregard the 
employer’s unlawful action.230 
2. No More Than an Unsubstantiated Suspicion: EEOC v. A & F 
EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch231 is a 2015 Title VII case that 
appeared in front of the Supreme Court, which demonstrates a gradual 
shift in analysis from a plaintiff’s “actual identity” towards the dis-
criminatory treatment by the employer.232 Although described as a 
“really easy” case by Justice Antonin Scalia,233 EEOC v. A & F’s 
holding may be probative for the more elusive perceived-as claims.234 
In 2007, Samantha Elauf, a 17-year old, applied for a sales associate 
position at Abercrombie & Fitch (A & F), a clothing store that des-
cribes its brand as “preppy”235 and representing a “classic east coast 
collegiate style.”236 Elauf did not get the position at A & F because she  
nonetheless be liable for hostile work environment harassment.”); Jones v. 
UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283, 1299 (11th Cir. 2012). 
228. Bennun v. Rutgers State Univ., 941 F.2d 154, 173 (3d Cir. 1991). 
229. Greene, supra note 50, at 126. See also Larson, supra note 138, at 469–72 
(explaining a cognitive bias approach of employment discrimination where 
an employer’s implicit bias will be used to judge subsequent behavior). This 
may explain why the EEOC deemed it important to protect stereotypical 
characteristics of a national origin that may cause implicit bias. See 29 
C.F.R. § 1601 EEOC. See also notes 179–187 and accompanying text. 
230. Greene, supra note 50, at 110. 
231. 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015). 
232. See generally Flake, supra note 119 (examining religious discrimination). 
233. The Editorial Board, Headscarves Before the Supreme Court, N.Y. Times 
(June 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/03/opinion/head-scarves 
-before-the-supreme-court.html?ref=topics&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/4DL5-
8CBW]. 
234. See Flake, supra note 119, at 128 (“After [EEOC v. A & F], it would be 
improper for a court to dismiss a religious discrimination claim based on an 
employer's misperception of an employee's religion, when the Supreme Court 
has declared that an employer's motive—not its knowledge—determines 
liability.”). 
235. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 1106, 1111 (10th Cir. 
2013), rev’d and remanded, 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015). 
236. See The Editorial Board, supra note 233. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 2·2016 
Perceived-As Plaintiffs 
268 
wore a black scarf around her head at the interview.237 A & F’s manage-
ment assumed she was Muslim and that the company would have to 
permit an accommodation to its “Look Policy,” which forbids sales asso-
ciates to wear the color black and head coverings. 238 
Subsequently, the EEOC brought a Title VII religious discrimin-
ation claim against A & F, on behalf of Elauf, and was granted sum-
mary judgment on liability.239 However, on appeal, A & F successfully 
argued that it had no liability because the management did not have 
actual knowledge that Elauf was Muslim.240 In June 2015, the Supreme 
Court reversed the Tenth Circuit’s actuality requirement and held that 
“an applicant need only show that [the] need for an accommodation 
was a motivating factor in the employer’s decision.”241 
EEOC v. A & F held that even if an employer “has no more than 
an unsubstantiated suspicion” that an accommodation would be needed, 
and refuses to hire based on that suspicion, the employer is liable under 
Title VII.242 If an employer does not know whether a certain action or 
objective appearance constitutes a religious practice, the employer may 
unknowingly still violate Title VII, which may raise fairness concerns 
for employers.243 
EEOC v. A & F applied the “motivating factor” provision of Title 
VII to determine A & F’s liability.244 This provision prohibits adverse 
employment action, even if the basis of discrimination was only a moti-
vating factor of the adverse action.245 The “motivating factor” provision  
237. A & F, 798 F. Supp. at 1277. 
238. Id. at 1277. 
239. A & F, 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2031 (2015). 
240. Id. at 2030. 
241. Id. at 2032 (emphasis added). 
242. Id. at 2033 (emphasis added). The Court, however, also noted that the 
perceived-as question will not be answered because neither party raised it. 
See id. at 2032 n.3 (2015) (“[I]t is arguable that the motive requirement itself 
is not met unless the employer at least suspects that the practice in question 
is a religious practice.”). 
243. See id. (Alito, J., concurrence). Justice Alito argued in his concurrence that 
he believed the Court’s holding would hold employers unfairly liable for 
practices that they did not know were religious practices because there is no 
requirement for knowledge of even the practice. Id. The majority responded 
that although “certainty that the practice exists may make it easier to infer 
motive . . . [it] is not a necessary condition of liability.” Id. at 2033. 
244. Id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(m) (2012) (“Except as otherwise provided 
in this subchapter, an unlawful employment practice is established when the 
complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though 
other factors also motivated the practice.”). 
245. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(m) (2012). 
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emphasizes the importance of investigating the employer’s action, not 
merely the Plaintiff’s actual identity.246 As applied in A & F, the 
“motivating factor” is relevant, whether or not the employer has 
knowledge of the need for an accommodation.247 This same reasoning 
should apply to discriminatory actions, whether or not the employer 
has knowledge of an individual’s actual identity.248 
V. Application of Perceived-As Discrimination Claims 
Recognizing perceived-as claims under Title VII would eliminate 
the plaintiff’s burden of proving their membership in a protected 
class.249 However, the same limitations that apply to “actual” discrimin-
ation cases under Title VII should also be applicable to perceived-as 
discrimination claims.250 An employer is liable under Title VII if they 
had a “reasonable belief that given employee is a member of a protected 
class.”251 
Perceived-as plaintiffs under Title VII would have the same burden 
as “regarded as” plaintiffs under the ADA: to prove that their employer 
mistakenly perceived them to be a member of a protected class.252 For 
a perceived-as discrimination claim to pass summary judgment, there 
 
246. Id. 
247. A & F, 135 S. Ct. at 2032 (“Title VII relaxes this standard, however, to 
prohibit even making a protected characteristic a “motivating factor” in an 
employment decision.” (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(m) (2012))). 
248. See generally Flake, supra note 119 at 131 (“[EEOC v. A & F]’s reach is not 
limited only to misperception-based religious discrimination. Misperception 
discrimination based on race, color, sex, and national origin is likewise 
prohibited.”). 
249. See supra Part IV. 
250. If not, there would be risk of overbroad covering of personal choices and 
identification, which Title VII was not intended to protect. See Hoffman, 
supra note 139, at 1524. See also Pattison et al., supra note 167, at 30 
(explaining that personal preferences are not protected by Title VII). 
251. Perkins v. Lake Cty. Dep’t of Util., 860 F. Supp 1262, 1277 (N.D. Ohio 
1994). See also Bennun v. Rutgers State Univ., 941 F.2d 154, 173 (3d Cir. 
1991) (explaining that “unlawful discrimination must be based on [the 
Plaintiff’s] objective appearance to others”). 
252. McNally v. Aztar Indiana Gaming Co., LLC, No. 3:12-CV-00063-TWP-
WGH, 2014 WL 300433, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 28, 2014) (holding that there 
is “no evidence . . . to support” regarded as disability discrimination); 
Spurling v. C & M Fine Pack, Inc., No. 1:11 CV 39, 2013 WL 655136, at *4 
(N.D. Ind. Feb. 21, 2013) (explaining that no regarded as disability 
discrimination occurred when there was evidence of plaintiff getting safety 
warnings while falling asleep and one doctors note). 
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should be either direct evidence of the perception,253 or some evidence 
that makes it reasonable to infer that the employer perceived the plain-
tiff as a member of a protected class.254 
For example, if a plaintiff were to claim national origin discrimi-
nation based on an accent, the accent should actually be noticeable 
enough that it is reasonable to infer a perception.255 Similarly, it may 
not be reasonable to infer perceived-as national origin discrimination 
based solely on a foreign language skill on an applicant’s résumé.256 A 
perceived-as claim based on name alone would most likely survive sum-
mary judgment because name association discrimination questions are 
“inherently fact-based.” 257 
Another question of fact for perceived-as discrimination could be 
whether an employer knows a certain practice is religious in nature, 
such as a scarf or a request to take days off that are widely known to 
 
253. Cf. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2031 (2015) 
(explaining that the manager “believed Elauf wore her headscarf because of 
her faith”); Perkins v. Lake Cty. Dep’t of Util., 860 F. Supp. 1262, 1270 
(N.D. Ohio 1994) (showing that employers and co-workers agree that 
Plaintiff “appears to be an American Indian”); Smith v. Specialty Pool 
Contractors, No. 02:07CV1464, 2008 WL 4410163, at *6 (W.D. Penn. Sept. 
24, 2008) (“a reasonable jury could find” that the defendant believed Plaintiff 
was Jewish, “even though Plaintiff told him otherwise”). 
254. See supra note 253. See also Scott v. Presbyterian Hosp., No. 3:11-CV-383, 
2012 WL 4846753, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 11, 2012) (explaining that under 
the ADA regarded-as prong, “[a]n employee may prove that she was 
discriminated against because of an actual or perceived impairment either 
by direct evidence or by the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green.”). See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
255. Nieves v. Metropolitan Dade Cty., 598 F. Supp. 955, 961 (S.D. Fla. 1984) 
(noting that, “neither from observing the Plaintiff nor from listening to his 
speech patterns, mannerisms and pronunciation of the English language was 
it apparent that Plaintiff was Hispanic”). 
256. See Mohammad v. J.P. Morgan Chase Nat’l Corp. Servs., Inc., 2013 WL 
5786016, at *7 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (holding that not enough evidence to show 
belief about national origin based on her resume or appearance). 
257. See DePriest v. Seaway Food Town, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 1355, 1357 (E.D. 
Mich. 1982) (denying defendants summary judgment because there is a 
factual dispute on whether Plaintiff’s name made defendant aware of 
national origin); Mohammad, 2013 WL 5786016, at *7; Onwauchi-Willing & 
Barnes, supra note 202, at 7. But see EEOC v. Trans States Airlines, 462 
F.3d 987, 992 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that name alone is not sufficient to 
prove national origin discrimination); Samorn Selim, What Does Your Name 
Say About You: The Eighth Circuit Undercuts Name Association in EEOC 
v. National Trans States Airlines, 28 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 607, 
611–12 (2007) (analyzing Trans States Airlines as barring more potential 
claims because name association discrimination is “inherently fact based 
questions”). 
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be religious holidays.258 Recognizing perceived-as claims reduces the risk 
of dismissing legitimate claims of employment discrimination under 
Title VII.259 
Conclusion 
This Note recommends that courts consider perceived-as discrimi-
nation claims on the merits, rather than deny them as a matter of law. 
There are many reasons for adopting this recommendation. Title VII’s 
similarity to the ADA, the Act’s legislative history, and the EEOC’s 
interpretation, all uniformly point in the direction of allowing plaintiffs 
to present perceived-as claims. Alone, any of those these reasons is com-
pelling; taken together, they form a powerful argument in favor of 
allowing plaintiffs like Nathanial Burrage, Anne Sears, and Hubert 
Yousif to make their case for relief under Title VII. 
Courts that continue to deny perceived-as claims perpetuate the 
problem of a federal law applying differently based solely on where a 
plaintiff brings her suit. More importantly, dismissing perceived-as 
claims of discrimination leads to an anomalous result. It vests in an 
employer who discriminates the power to determine whether a plaintiff 
may present her case in court. Under that reasoning, a defendant who 
discriminates on the basis of a misperception avoids liability for their 
misconduct solely because of their mistake. But a person’s right to be 
free from workplace discrimination should not be contingent on such 
distinctions. And there certainly is no policy reason to reward a defen-
dant who practices workplace discrimination in the first place.  
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258. See supra notes 235–238 and accompanying text. 
259. See Stephen F. Befort, An Empirical Examination of Case Outcomes Under 
The ADA Amendments Act, 70 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 2027, 2062 (2013) 
(explaining that the “regarded as” expansion of the ADA amendments have 
more claims that survive the summary judgment stage). 
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